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The Quest for Efficiency in the Public Sector: 
Economists Versus Dr. Pangloss 
(or why conservative economists are not nearly conservative enough) 
Anthony J. Culyer 
The end of a Congress is not the place for heavy arguments and it is no 
part of my intention today to overload you with weighty reflections on 
what has passed during the last few days, nor indeed to burden your 
already taxed intellects with new theories or new facts about anything at 
all. The end of a congress may, however, be an appropriate place to amuse, 
titillate or irritate. I shall try to irritate you—possibly I shall raise a wry 
smile or two but basically I want to annoy. I shall try to do so by putting a 
set of dilemmas to you, each of which will, I hope, make you thoroughly 
uncomfortable. 
As economists, we all—or nearly all—subscribe to the fundamental 
postulate of human action that individuals are expected utility maximisers. 
This, coupled with the assumption that individual tastes vary and the fur-
ther assumption that compensated demand curves have negative price elas-
ticities, leads to nearly all the important propositions that economists have 
to make about the real world—whether they are being normative or positive 
(or simply fudging the difference between the two). For example, the posi-
tive theory of exchange uses the assumptions I have just mentioned to 
predict that there will be only one price for each economic good. Any 
variance in prices will be explained by the presence of transaction, trans-
port, etc costs. Since these are real social costs, we do not consider such a 
situation- as a market failure. On the contrary, the market is doing just the 
job it should. How does this happen? It happens because prior decisions 
have also been taken about the market institutions that enable trade to take 
place: the definition and enforcement of private property entitlements, the 
law of contract, conventional ideas of decent behavior, and so on. These 
institutional arrangements can similarly be seen as the product of individual 
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maximisation and bargaining: private property rights, for example, will not 
be established when the expectation is that enforcement costs, etc. will 
exceed the gains from trade and the orderly conduct of affairs. Put less 
strongly, individuals will not choose to change existing arrangements unless 
those seeing a benefit therefrom can also compensate those who anticipate a 
loss. It is, therefore, not just our theory of processes within markets that 
depends on utility maximising subject to constraints; it is our theories of 
political action, family behaviour, public or private bureaucracy, and our 
theories of the choice of allocative institution (market or state) that also 
depend on the same behaviour-generating postulate. 
Economic efficiency or, as it is sometimes called, Pareto-efficiency (the 
two terms are synonymous), is defined as an arrangement from which no 
change can be made that does not impose uncompensated harms on some-
one. This is indeed our only concept of full efficiency. It does not inciden-
tally imply consumer sovereignty, but the sovereignty of all individuals. It 
therefore follows, I suggest, that, since at any moment in time our positive 
theory of exchange tells us that all genuine gains from trade will have been 
exhausted, then at every moment of time there will be an efficient allocation 
of resources. This will be true of gains from deals done within a constitu-
tional and institutional context and it is also true of the chosen (or existing) 
constitutional and institutional context itself. It is true of so-called market 
activities. It is true also of nonmarket activities. It is also true of public 
sector activities. For were it not so, and unexploited net social gains existed, 
then it cannot be the case that individuals are expected utility maximisers. 
They may, of course, regret consequences they did not foresee. But, at the 
time, what was, was efficient. They may also, of course, regard the constitu-
tional context as unfair, unfree or unjust, so that, for example, the power-
less and poor have no means to bribe the powerful and rich. But that is a 
question of distribution, not efficiency. To be logically consistent, then, we 
must, I suggest, accept that at any moment in time all is for the best 
(efficiency wise) otherwise it would have paid someone to incur costs per-
suading others to agree to change it, to incur costs identifying and compen-
sating those who lose, to incur costs of enforcing any contracts thus made. 
Turning specifically to the topic of our congress, it follows therefore, that 
the public sector too is always efficient. And so it appears that the quest for 
efficiency in the public sector is an empty quest—not because the public 
sector can never, inherently, be efficient (as some of us seem to have argued 
here), but because it is always efficient. Economists must therefore be Pan-
glossians. The size, scope and composition of the public sector in all coun-
tries must represent an economically efficient allocation. And that has to be 
as true of the USSR as it must be of HongKong. 
I am not, of course, suggesting that all—or even most—institutional 
changes that do take place arc Pareto-efficient moves. They nearly always 
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involve uncompensated harms and may even result in a less efficient resul-
tant state of affairs. But it does not follow that putting the change into 
reverse will necessarily improve things, for the reverse change is itself 
costly (it may even be more costly than the original change) and meanwhile 
society may well have changed in important ways not previously accounted 
for. So there is an assymetry here: absence of change, according to Dr. 
Pangloss, implies that all is for the best; the presence of change may but 
only "may" imply that things are going to be for the better. 
Recall the words that Voltaire put into Dr. Pangloss' mouth: 
"Il est demontre, disait-il, que les chores ne peuvent etre autrement; 
car tout etant fait pour une fin, tout est necessairement pour la meilleure 
fin. Remarquez bien que les nez ont ete faits pour porter des lunettes; aussi 
avons-nous des lunettes. Les jambes sont visiblement instituees pour etre 
chaussees, et nous avons des chausses. . . . par consequent, ceux qui ont 
avance que tout est bien ont dit une sottise; it fallait dire que tout est au 
mieux." 
Also sprach Dr. Pangloss; and while few economists subscribe to so 
all-pervading an optimism about the current state of any society, many—
especially good price theorists—are indeed prone to the view that the the-
ory of exchange implies—at least as far as efficiency is concerned—that 
things actually are for the best and that the private sector (or for that 
matter, though few price theorists would ever say as much, the public 
sector) is at all times and in all places Pareto-efficient. After all, were it not, 
it would have been changed: gainers would have bribed losers from any 
change in the composition, scale or organisation of the public (or private) 
sector, or in the balance between public and private, and Pareto-efficient 
moves to Pareto-efficient states would be made. If they are not, so the 
argument will go, then all must be for the best (really one should, of course, 
say a best), for the costs of making the change, of overcoming inertias, 
bribing bureaucrats, or meeting whatever other transaction costs might 
exist, must—as evidenced by behavior—be too large or too uncertain rela-
tive to benefits (which may themselves also of course be too uncertain). 
You might object that the means available to a society for effecting 
change are needlessly cumbersome, costly and imperfect and that they lead 
to extremely poor revelations of people's preferences. But, as I have argued, 
the same Panglossian argument applies here too: even constitutional and 
institutional changes are costly; and to ignore such costs is to advocate 
Pareto-inefficient constitutions and institutions. Absence of constitutional 
or institutional change, or of any change in the procedures by which deci-
sions are reached, is behavioral evidence for their efficiency whether the 
society in question is best characterised as feudal, capitalist, socialist, or 
anything else. Optimal institutional structures and optimal preference reve-
lation are not going to be perfect, for an efficient constitutional and institu- 
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tional arrangement will normally entail the presence of residual costs of 
decision making, bargaining and transacting in the everyday world. These 
are genuine opportunity costs like any other opportunity cost. Most conser-
vative economists are therefore far too radical: their presumption that 
merely the market is efficient is not enough. The public sector is efficient 
too. The political system is efficient. Everything is efficient. Everything is 
wonderful! 
Economists are naturally unhappy with Dr. Pangloss' conservatism 
and nonscientific tautology, whether on social or methodological grounds, 
or both. Candide too had his doubts. Yet it does have one signal virtue of a 
methodological type: in trying to account for the social phenomena we 
observe it compels us to ask the question "why does something happen or 
why does a particular arrangement exist—it has to be efficient for something 
or someone?": a question that has led to remarkable developments in the 
positive economics of politics, bureaucracy, the family and a host of untra-
ditional spheres for the application of economic analysis. Moreover, to cast 
the Panglossian view aside does seem to require one to ignore (that is treat 
as zero) some social costs (in particular, transaction costs) and hence involve 
one in the fallacy of the free lunch—again an anathema to all good price 
theorists. How then can we escape? For it looks as though we economists 
are all—and always have been—redundant as moralists, welfarists and ex-
perts in the means of enhancing efficiency. 
Escaping Dr. Pangloss' Clutches—Conservative Radical Style 
One time-honoured manner of escape from the enchantments of Dr. 
Pangloss is to retain (conservatively) the individualistic postulates as both 
the underpinnings of behavioural models and the ideological basis for iden-
tifying "welfare" and changes in it, and to seek to promote change (perhaps 
radically) through persuasion. This view is founded on the proposition that 
economists know some things better than others know them; in particular, 
that economists have a comparative advantage in identifying Pareto-efficient 
states and Pareto-efficient moves. The possibility is thereby opened up that 
absence of change is not itself evident of the efficiency of the current state 
of things; it is merely the result of failure of gainers (and losers) to perceive 
the net advantages of change and also to devise appropriate means of ensur-
ing the acceptability of any change. How many cost-benefit analyses of 
public sector activity, for example, press beyond the computation of net 
benefits to the detailed identification of losers from the change, the size of 
their losses, and means by which they may be compensated sufficiently to 
accept the change? (It must be said that all too frequently even economists 
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fail to address themselves to this second type of question which accounts, I 
conjecture, for the failure of so many results of cost-benefit analysis to have 
been acted upon). 
Into this category of persuasion falls an immense range of economic 
policy advice: marginal cost pricing for nationalised industry; vouchers for 
education; redistribution in cash rather than kind; removal of price controls; 
reliance on markets for resource allocation. Intellectual activity here consists 
in the invention, reinvention, or resurrection of policy means that are al-
leged to lead to improved efficiency in the public (or private) sector, where 
the means proposed may be rules, mechanisms or behavioural constraints. 
Yet, while economists may succeed in persuading one another of the value 
of such things (or at least suceed in persuading fellow-members of a particu-
lar school of economics) they often fail dismally to persuade anyone else. 
One set of reasons for this may, of course, be that efficiency is but one 
of the moral objectives that societies should seek and that it may conflict 
with others. But, even in the quest for efficiency itself, it may be that 
economists are giving unpersuasive advice. Efficient pricing rules, for ex-
ample, are not only subject to the problems of second best, there are a set of 
even more fundamental issues relating, as our former president Jack Wise-
man has so often told us, to the very notion of opportunity cost: in particu-
lar its evanescent and subjective nature as the perception of the most highly 
valued alternative course of action at the moment of decision in a highly 
uncertain world. 
Or consider the application of a fundamental theorem of welfare eco-
nomics that, provided certain conditions were met, a market will not only 
produce a Pareto-efficient allocation but, provided the government can de-
termine an appropriate distribution of purchasing power in the community, 
it can even produce a Pareto-efficient allocation that the government may 
prefer on distributional grounds. This argument is not, of course, based on 
any Panglossian considerations. 
We know that the circumstances required for this fundamental theo-
rem to hold are extremely demanding and are not in practice met. Nonethe-
less, entire armies of economists devote their attention to trying to persuade 
the community that efficiency would be enhanced by returning substantial 
areas of the public sector to the market place. This sometimes involves 
going to quite extraordinary lengths. For example, I can think of no society 
that even approximates the formal theoretical conditions for Pareto-efficiency 
in its health service markets, yet this has not inhibited many economists on 
the one hand from attributing all the apparent ills of our health services to 
the interference of the state nor, on the other, from confidently predicting 
substantial welfare improvements from effecting such a shift. The truth is 
that in health, as in many other areas, we do not know enough to advocate 
sweeping reforms based on general theories asserted to be true under only 
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highly restrictive circumstances. At least Dr. Pangloss was modest in his 
policy recommendations (indeed one could scarcely be more modest!) 
whereas our reformers, whether of the left or the right, typically erect more 
policy edifices than theory or evidence can usually support. 
Or take, alternatively, the widespread arguments one hears about the 
behavioural response of managers, bureaucrats, producers and consumers to 
changes in the constraints they confront. Much of this literature asserts that 
public sector management and bureaucracy will be less efficient than man-
agement and bureaucracy in the private sector. At their naivest, those who 
recommend policy based upon such theorising fall into the trap of assuming 
that the only efficiency-generating source of behaviour is the pursuit of 
wealth, which must surely be one of the naivest—not to say amateur—
psychological theories around. Even at their more sophisticated the new 
theories of managerial, bureaucratic and political behaviour are still too 
infant and too little exposed to systematic empirical test for us to assert 
their logical implications as empirically well-founded and for us really to be 
able to assert their beneficence as confidently as some do. 
As it happens I do believe that economists have a comparative advan-
tage in the invention, reinvention and resurrection of policy instruments 
that may identify newly perceived opportunities for increased efficiency. 
But I would conjecture that we are most valid when we are empirically 
most specific and most persuasive when we are most modest in the extent of 
change proposed. The bold claims from right or left for the efficiency of 
markets or collectivism are simply not persuasively sustainable. 
Escaping Dr. Pangloss' Clutches—Radical Radical Style 
The other time-honoured manner of escape for those still wanting to be 
normative is to be radical both about the basic postulates as well as about 
the promotion of social change. For example, one may reject the essentially 
static concept of Pareto-efficiency. Instead one may advocate competition as 
an agent of efficiency via the process of discovery and invention. This 
particularly German/Austrian way of looking at things emphasises process 
(and progress) so that efficiency is, as it were, a process of becoming rather 
than a state that can be usefully described in terms of the familiar marginal 
conditions (even if they include uncertainty, externality and intertemporal 
trading). 
It is not clear to me, however, that "competition" is so easily measured 
that one can say that it is "more" here and "less" there (is a race between 
500 more competitive than one between two?), nor is it clear to me that the 
types of competition observed in the public sector are systematically more 
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or less conducive to dynamic efficiency than those observed in, say, the 
tomato market. Moreover, although I am ignorant of any applications of 
this sort of analysis to specific problems in the public sector (they doubtless 
exist), I am quite confident that such applications are neither so numerous 
nor their empirical results so widely accepted in the economics fraternity 
that they can escape the difficulty noted above with the static theories of 
managerial, bureaucratic and political behaviour. They may be promising 
beginnings, but they are scarcely an adequate basis for persuasive and 
specific policy advice. Indeed, all the arguments with which I am familiar 
in this genre are entirely a priori and disturbingly general. They may be the 
intellectual stuff of which revolutions get made but they offer little assis-
tance in the quest for efficiency in the public sector (or any other). Revolu-
tions, of course, are omelettes made by breaking eggs and have nothing to 
do with economic efficiency. 
An alternative escape route is to question the maximand. The tradi-
tional individualistic framework provides both the basis for the utility maxi-
mising analysis of behaviour (whether in groups or individually) and also 
the basis for the social welfare function: the rockets of both positive and 
normative economics are fired from the same launching pad. It is, there-
fore, unsurprising that Dr. Pangloss poses a problem mainly for economists 
who use neoclassical individualism as their modus operandi. But for those 
who adopt more proximate maximands, say, a target for steel output, or 
who view the business of health services as increasing the health of popula-
tions, or the business of schools as keeping teachers in employment, the 
problem disappears. Similarly, those enamoured of a "merit want" ap-
proach to many of the activities in the public sector (particularly, perhaps, 
those in the social services—including health, education and housing) cut 
the Panglossian knot with a single bold sweep of a sword. It is not surpris-
ing, of course, that economists who adopt this strategy attract the contempt 
of the methodological individualists. But they do (at least) have the virtue of 
using a methodology that gets them decisively out of Dr. Pangloss' clutches 
and that, moreover, enables them to relate much more easily to policy 
customers unencumbered with one awkward—and hard to communicate—
part of the utilitarian baggage of neoclassicism. 
Should We Take Dr. Pangloss Seriously? 
I think we should. It is common to label prima facie departures from 
Pareto-efficiency in the market as "market failures". Setting aside adverse 
distributional affects (which may be important, but are not directly relevant 
to efficiency questions) the usual sources of failure that are adduced include 
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phenomena like monopoly (natural or otherwise), externalities, and failure 
to establish and enforce exchangeable property rights. Source of "govern-
ment failure" can be similarly categorised. The standard microeconomic 
approach to such issues is to identify potential efficiency gains. We do not 
assert that the optimal degree of pollution is necessarily zero, but that it is 
determined by an equality between the marginal benefit of reduced pollu-
tion and the marginal cost of effecting a reduction. We do not assert that all 
monopoly must be prohibited, but contrast, say, the loss of scale economies 
that may be incurred by breaking monopolies with the net gains in con-
sumer and producer surplusses that may result. We do not assert that all 
entitlements and contracts should be clearly defined in law, be legally 
binding and coercively enforced, but balance expected gains against pro-
spective costs of enforcement, etc. 
An economic Dr. Pangloss does therefore have a point. For if all 
individuals are utility maximisers, and if we believe in the theory of ex-
change, and if Pareto-efficiency is defined as an allocation from which no 
move can be made without imposing an uncompensated reduction in utility 
somewhere in the community, then all costs and benefits will have been 
considered. Trades not made; monopolies not broken; institutions not in-
vented and used; voting systems not used; collective or individual arrange-
ments not adopted; points not attained on contract curves; and so on, must 
all have not been engaged in or attained because they were judged too 
costly. Market, or government, failure, according to Dr. Pangloss, is ap-
parent not real: it is the product of imperfectly specified optimality condi-
tions, in particular, conditions that omit some relevant marginal (or total) 
social costs. 
It is surprising that economists have not taken Dr. Pangloss more 
seriously. I detect—though it would be invidious to name names—that 
economists using methodological individualism who come from market 
economies tend implicitly to adopt a Panglossian view of the market. But 
scarcely anyone takes this view of the public sector. Instead, there is an 
assymetry: market allocations are presumptively efficient and public sector 
allocations presumptively inefficient. This leads to an assymetry in the 
locations of burdens of proof: economists advocating, for example, a trans-
fer of activity from the private to the public sector are required to demon-
strate the a priori and empirical reasons for so doing (there being no general 
presumption that such a transfer of activity will yield a Pareto-improve-
ment). By contrast, economists advocating a transfer of activity from the 
public sector to the private are rarely required by their fellow professionals 
to do other than rehearse some general a priori arguments (for in this case 
there is a shared presumption about the Pareto-efficiency of such a transfer 
of activity). Of course, outside the economics fraternity no such presump-
tions may exist. 
The Quest for Efficiency in the Public Sector 	 47 
What I should like to suggest is that we should take Dr. Pangloss more 
seriously and argue that the burden of proof lies on him who advocates any 
change; that the general presumption is that whatever is, is Pareto-efficient; 
at its weakest, that the quest for efficiency in the public sector is neither 
more nor less problematic than the quest for efficiency in the private sector. 
For those who are uncomfortable with the Darwinian and conservative 
implications of Panglossian methodology, there seem to be four tenable 
escape routes, of which two have been described. The first is to argue that 
the economist's role in the quest for efficiency is entrepreneurial: the inven-
tion, reinvention or resurrection of allocative mechanisms; and the provision 
of information about the incidence of the costs of change and how such 
losses may be compensated—at least for those with sufficient political 
power to sabotage any reform. The test of their success in identifying 
potential Pareto improvements is whether their entrepreneurial inventions 
get adopted. And they have no business to complain when their inventions 
are rejected, for when they are rejected, the inventions were plainly fail-
ures. Since economic advice is nearly always rejected, this is an unpromis-
ing escape route. The second escape route is to reject the individualistic 
basis of the concept of Pareto-efficiency in favour of more limited and 
specific objectives possibly linked with a specific recognition that one is 
seeking least cost methods of meeting particular levels of merit wants. Since 
nearly everyone disapproves of the merit good approach, this too is an 
unpromising escape route. I leave it to each of you to select your own route 
from these two unpromising prospects. 
There are, however, the other two escape routes—though I doubt 
whether any of you will find them even as appealing as the previous two 
(which is why I have given them no attention hitherto): 
One is to argue that most of what economists deplore in the public 
sector is the result of mistakes: collective policies were originally adopted in 
high expectation of success and were even, perhaps, Pareto-efficient in 
terms of expected utility. But the hopes are dashed and economists pursu-
ing the quest for public sector efficiency are there to document the failure, 
explain why it occurred and show how to avoid it in the future. The 
trouble with this view is that the so-called mistakes seem to persist beyond 
any reasonable learning period. For example, what public regulatory policy 
has been more consistently decried by economists for at least 50 years than 
rent controls. There are dozens of articles allegedly demonstrating their 
inefficiency. They are a classic case study in nearly every textbook. More-
over they have also been demonstrated to have regressive distributive conse-
quences. I cannot think of a single economic voice in their support. Yet rent 
controls persist and they persist in nearly every developed country in the 
world. Yet if they were really inefficient, their removal would have enabled 
a net gain to accrue to everyone, landlords and tenants. Ergo, they are 
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either efficient or individuals are not utility maximisers. So, while mistakes 
may happen from time to time there is something in the Panglossian view 
that they do not happen very often. There seems little mileage in this way 
out. 
The final escape route is simply to ignore the basic problem of inconsis-
tency to which Pangloss is really drawing our attention. After all, we have 
got along for many years with the inconsistencies between, say, macroeco-
nomics and microeconomics. One could simply sweep the problem under 
the carpet. However, I don't think this is a route many of you would 
choose, for even if an ultimately completely consistent economic theory of 
human action can never be attained, we are surely bound to seek it. 
Whether we are going to be Panglossian or anti-Panglossian we should at 
least seek consistency, for Dr. Pangloss is surely right in drawing our 
attention to the inconsistencies in much current practice: whether it be the 
inconsistency of accounting for some opportunity costs but not all; or the 
inconsistency of assuming that individuals simultaneously realise all achiev-
able mutual gains from trade while leaving some unexploited; or the incon-
sistency of assuming that individuals choose rationally within institutional 
contexts but choose their institutions irrationally; or the inconsistency of 
having differential presumptions about the degree of efficiency in the public 
sector relative to the private. Inconsistency is a great enemy. As Voltaire 
would have said (though not, I think, of inconsistency) Ecr. l'inf! 
Resume 
Le Docteur PANGLOSS soutient que, puisque tous les individus 
maximisent toujours l'utilite attendue, tous les gains que l'on attend du 
commerce sont realises ex-ante, sous reserve de toutes les contraintes de 
caractere reel. De plus il soutient que toutes les institutions mises en place 
par les collectivites pour des transactions d'affaires connaitront le maximum 
d'efficacite souhaitee etant entendu aussi qu'elles sont soumises aux con-
traintes inherentes aux ressources naturelles et qu'elles savent que les indivi-
dus maximiseront l'utilite qu'ils en attendent quel que soit le systeme de 
reglementation et d'institutions que l'on adopte. En consequence, tout est 
toujours pour le mieux, ex-ante, et il n'y a pas de place pour des econo-
mistes reformateurs qui chercheraient par exemple a changer l'equilibre 
entre secteurs publics et prives pour des raisons d'efficacite. Mais ont-ils 
vraiment une place apres tout? Nous suggerons quatre possihilites re-
streintes qui semblent etre consistantes avec la logique a la fois constants et 
penible du Docteur Pangloss. 
